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FORGETTING THE PAST, CONSIDERING THE FUTURE: 
ANGLO-JAPANESE RELATIONS AND THE 1990s 
Roger Buckley 
Ties between Britain and Japan are in a process of trans!ormat10n. 
The 1mplicat1ons of this sea change both with regard to the bilateral 
relationship and for mternational politics and the world economy have 
yet, however, to receive the comentary they warrant. This paper offers 
some prelimmary thoughts on trends that potentially could greatly alter 
the manner in which both nations have perceived the other and 
conducted their diplomacy. 
The controversy surrounding the fmal Illness and funeral of the late 
Emperor provides a convenient benchmark m any survey of postwar 
Anglo Japanese relations"' Once the sound and fury associated with 
Imperial Japan’s behaviour m the Pacific War had dissolved, it became 
possible for politicians in both countries to state more叩 enlytheir 
vis10ns of the future without the albatross of the war having to be 
constantly recalled However unpleasant the press criticisms of the late 
Emperor were to the Japanese government, there were undoubtedly 
unplanned advantages in airing Bntish gnevances The death of the 
Showa Emperor removed what was widely-1£ wrongly perceived to 
be a personal link between Japanese wartime aggression and the late 
20th century. This sense of the Showa Emperor's personal responsibility 
that was shared by many people in Bntam could obviously not be 
transferred to his eldest son who had been httle more than a boy 
during the Pacific War. By the autumn of 1991, it was apparent that 
pubhc views had changed to the extent that Japan’s Crown Prince 
could visit Britam to open the largest ever Japan Festival, an event 
that m itself symbolizes the transformation of Anglo-Japanese ties'" 
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Yet neither much of the erosion of British hostility towards Japan’s 
wartime behav1our01 nor effective promotion of cultural diplomacy are m 
themselves adequate explanaltons for the shift in popular views 
towards contemporary Japan. The key to this shift is economics. Maior 
mward investment by Japanese industrial concerns has been (and is 
hkely to continue to be) the factor that has led to a new relationship 
with Bntam. One telling anecdote from 1991 demonstrates how far 
British visions of Japan have altered; mstead of the predatory Asian 
capitalists dumping their cheaply produced manufacfored goods on the 
British home market, the Bntish media gave fulsome praise m their 
obituaries to Honda Sotchiro. There were no longer the pointed 
references of past years to the extent to which Honda had single-
handedly brought about the collapse of the Bnltsh motorcycle industry 
or hurt later the remaining British car manufacturers.＂ゆ Fromthe 
perspective of changing Anglo-Japanese relations the most sigmficant 
sentence m the obituary stated simply that, followmg the estabhshment 
of Honda Motor Company's production plants in the United States in 
1982, a 'British assembly plant ts due to start operations m Swindon m 
late 1992’問
Large scale commitments by Japanese mdustnalists to the operation 
of car plants in Britain over recent years mark a caesura in contempo 
rary ties Attentive and persistent diplomacy by the embassy in Tokyo, 
with follow-ups on ministerial and prime ministerial visits to Japan'"・ 
have led to very considerable success in persuading a hesitant Japanese 
motor industry to invest in Britam on a scale that dwarfs that of many 
of its European competitors. 
The ability of the Thatcher government to persuade a very 
considerable number of Japanese companies to set up factones m 
Bntam has had repercussions both within the country and beyond that 
testify to the importance of these measures Sir Geoffrey Howe, 
speaking to the Japan ・Institute for International Affairs in Tokyo, gave 
in summer of 1991 the British approach when he argued 'it is 
important for the United Kingdom and Japan to sustam and develop 
the strongest possible relationship For that is likely to make the best 
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Source . The New York Times rep,.nted in A四h• Evening News, 19 Aug田t1991 
contribution to the vigour as well as the openness of the dialogue 
between Japan, the EC and the rest of the world’＂＇ Former Foreign 
Secretary Howe employed the progress that he claimed to see m the 
dismantling of EC protective measures as 'a mode of a sort’， which 
'perhaps point the way toward a more spontaneously open relationship 
between the rules of Japan’s economy and those of Europe and the 
United States’＂＇ What Howe intended to demonstrate was that his 
country’s strategy of gettmg Japan to build car plants in the British 
regions was ultimately m the mterests of Japan, Britain and the wider 
European Commumty This, however, is a view not widely shared by 
Britain’S EC partners and ts likely to remam a source of tension 
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throughout the 1990s. 
Matters came to a head with the announcement in Brussels of 
agreement by the Japanese government and EC of the latest plan to 
limit the sale of Japanese cars within the common market.1" Attention 
throughout the EC on the question of Japan’s economic impact on 
Europe has long focussed on the size of quotas for both imported and 
EC made Japanese cars. Critics wasted no time in attempting to 
disparage the Japan EC agreement. At its crudest there were confident 
predictions that the deal would not hold water. The New York Times 
correspondent in Paris、Namedthat the ’first of 、Nhatare likely to be 
many battles stemming from the vaguely worded agreement has 
already broken out over the issue of Japanese product10n in Europe’00) 
The accord, which was not signed by either party and therefore can be 
seen as in keeping with・ earlier “gentlemen’s agreements”， stated that 
direct car imports from Japan wil be virtually frozen at existing levels 
until 19991"1 but that production of Japanese cars within Europe would 
be permitted to grow rapidly over the next seven years間 The
European interpretation of the agreement is that Japan’s percentage of 
the European car market will increase through what the trade terms 
"transplants”－cars largely made at Japanese owned plants in the EC 
Statistics from EC sources have suggested that production of such cars 
wil grow in sIZe from 260,000 umts sold m 1990 to 1,200,000 by 1999 
Japanese sources noted, however, that this was 'what the EC 
Commission said unilaterally’and that it was 'not somethmg that wil 
bind the Japanese side'"" Opponents of any large-scale Japanese car 
industry in Europe have also argued that 1! production of Japanese 
transplants exceeds the 1.200,000 umts then import ceilings ought to be 
correspondingly lowered 
The government of Prime Mmister John Maior has already denied 
that this was ever envisaged in the protracted negotiations that 
supposedly hold Japan’s total share of what wil then be the largest car 
market in the world to 16 09% The British view is that Japan has been 
given the green hght to mcrease its EC made car product10n and that 
no formal constraints now exist in this area Clearly London has 
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championed Nagoya, and the rival European mdustnal states wil 
attempt to hold out for their verston of events All that is certain is 
that the uncertamt1es reflect the enormous difftculties of creatmg any 
EC-wide industnal policy and that ’there remain enough loopholes in 
the deal to drive a fleet of Euro-hatchbacks through stdeways ＇＜川
The debate over EC car volume stat1sttcs has worked to strengthen 
British-Japanese relations The more that French Pnme Minister Edith 
Cresson has complamed in vehement terms about the Japanese ’threat' 
the more entrenched Japanese pubhc opinion has become and the more 
that thts has encouraged Anglo Japanese hopes of a common front. 
Britain has been seen to champton the Japanese cause and to do so at 
the nsk of jeopardizing EC unity on a crucial issue. The contrast 
between Mme. Cresson’s widely reported remark thai the Japanese ’sit 
up al night thinking of ways to screw the Amencans and Europea-
ns .They are our common enemy’問， andthe opinion of the Japanese 
organizers of the Japan Festtval in London that ’Britain is, among other 
European countnes, most interested in Japan. It welcomes investments 
from Japan, since, unhke some other countnes, it tries to see Japan as 
the country which brmgs about opportunities, not problems'＇問 could
hardly be sharper 
Clearly there is no agreement within the European Community on 
what ought to be the appropriate response to the bourgeonmg 
economtc power of Japan. Yet the Thatcher and Major governments 
have felt increasingly confident that the British approach to Japan is 
reapmg rewards and that 1t ts litle short of absurd for the EC to deny 
the industrial and financial realities represented by the second largest 
economtc power in the world. Recent staltsttics wtl undoubtedly have 
worked to confirm the validtty of London’s strategy at least in the eyes 
of the British government."" Japan may stil have a considerable way to 
go before it ts taken seriously in its internattonal political deahngs""', 
but the economtc dtmenston has become mcreasingly important over 
the past decade to the extent that no survey of mternat10nal economics 
would fail to note the enviable investment levels, producttvity gams, 
and economic growth rates of an affluent Japan. To in割引， assome EC 
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nations have been tempted to do, that the only solution for beleagured 
European industries 1s to pul up the drawbridge and retreat mto a 
“fortress Europe”enclave has been firmly reJected by Britain 
The French government sees such “collaboration" with the “enemy” 
as sheer defeatism that endangers the livelihood of entire industries, 
results in higher prices for consumers, and mev1tably wil lead to 
Tokyo’s global domination of the mternational political economy unless 
united action can not be achieved immediately to derail the Asian 
juggernaut The evidence of the immment collapse of Europe’s 
computer mdustry, the dangers of further penetration of the EC's car 
market, and the rapid growth of Japan’s financial sector within Europe 
are al cited by Japan's European opponents as dangerous mcidents 
that are contributmg to Japanese economic hegemony.1陶
British ofhcal and popular views of Japan stand in sharp contrast to 
what existed a decade earlier. There is now a very considerable 
reserv01r of goodwill towards contemporary Japan. This is likely to be 
maintained, despite mountmg criticism from some other members of 
the EC at the British endeavours to attract Japanese inward invest 
ment that in turn could act to destroy rival European mdustries Bnt1sh 
press accounts of Japanese purchases of London property sites and the 
influence of Japanese money throughout Brihsh society are remarkably 
mdd. The widely anticipated criticism of Japan that its money would 
be deployed to buy up the ch01cest department stores and Scottish golf 
courses has simply not gamed much ground. The British press has 
proved itself even-handed m its commentaries on such possible 
themes. The Times, for example, suggested that‘Japanese money, 
technology and industrial thmking are changmg the complexion of 
Britam far beyond the factory gates’聞 Yetthe tone was far from 
antagonistic. The same article noted that‘Japanese money is hidden 
under the most unlikely British mattresses. Japanese banks are among 
the biggest lenders to the “Anglo French" Channel tunnel. Japanese 
mvestors have helped to make successes of many Bntish government 
share privat1sahons, propping up the price of the stocks you own’削
Much of the postive tone can be at廿1butedto two key factors: the 
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Japanese investment record in the motor car industry and continued 
Japanese purchases of property, particularly m central London. The 
current economic recession in Britain with its obvious tmpact on 
employment prospects and property values has led to a sense of almost 
gratitude in both instances for Japan’s large-scale mvolvement間
Conserval!ve Members of Parliament have been fulsome m thetr praise 
for the change in mdustrial attitudes that the Japanese car manufactu 
rers appear to be engendering in the midlands and northern parts of 
England間， whilemitial academtc assessments point to approximately 
the same trends.剛 Greaterinterest in Japanese managerial techmques, 
industrial destgn and small-group working units is also the consequence 
of Japan’s new prominence m Britain 
Any comprehenstve explanat10n for the poltical, economic, and social 
dimensions of the recent transformation of Anglo-Japanese relations is 
clearly yet premature. The shifts are stil m their infancy and a back-
lash against the Japanese “invaston" IS certainly possible as the scale of 
Japan’s penetration of the Bntish economy contmues to escalate. Yet 
even at this stage the degree of alteration m governmental and public 
perceptions deserves note. No future Labour cabinet is ltkely to 
discourage contmued Japanese inward investment, though 1t may be 
less generous in granting such generous financial mducements as in the 
past酬 Noretreat equally is possible for the Japanese car manufactur 
ers, though obviously the fmancial institul!ons that have mvested m 
British property and built up investment portfolios can always liquidate 
port旧nsof their holdings overnight as and when the fmancial climate 
so dtctates. Ironically, events since the mid-1980s have produced a 
sense of expectation in Bntain where any long term moderation of 
Japanese mvolvement in Britain ts more likely to fuel British disappoint 
ment than concern over yet further purchases. Such switches in 
international relattons in so short a time span are rare and deserve 
much fuller commentary. The generally enthusiastic approach of Bnl!sh 
society to the perceived strengths and confidence of industnal Japan 
suggests a widespread acknowledgement of British economic decline 
and a willmgness to co-opt its former antagonist m a new partnership. 
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The British government must now hope that its new fnendsh1p with 
Japan will produce dividends for Landon in the international political 
arena that can help correct the self evident economic imbalance 剛 But
that 1s another story. 
Japanese direct investment in 
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Notes 
(1) See Buckley 'The Empernr Question Again: Anglo-Japanese Relations, 1945 & 
!989’in The Journal of Sodal Science, ICU, 1991 and 'Defe•t and Death: British 
Attitudes to the Emperor in 1945 and 1989: a study in comtemporary Anglo-
Japanese relations' paper presented both to the 12th International Association of 
HIStonans of AS!a conference Hong Kong and the Pacifw coast branch of the 
Amencan Historical Association Hawaii, summer 1991. 
(2) On the japan Festival see remarks by Yamarnki Toshio, secretary-general of the 
Japan Committee of the Japan Fe<tival. in Asahi Evening News, 30 August 
!991. 
For neces,.ry quahficatmns " far as some Pacific War veterans are concerned 
see Louis Allen’S comments m Geoffrey Murray’s articleιRight mg Wrongs，’ 
Intersect, PHP, (Tokyo, April !990). 
(3) It was noticeable that even when an editorial in The Economist instructed japan 
to reconsider its past there was no reference to specific atrocities agamst British 
POWs. Until recently comment on this theme was virtually obligatory in al 
quartm of the British pre田 See’Redemption’s Reward', The E印刷用ist,24 
August 1991. 
(4) Obituary, The T;mes』 6 August 1991 The space, complete with large 
photograph』tookup half a page The obituary stressed both the individualism of 
Honda and his rags-to nches success story 
(5) ;bid. The tone of the obituary reads almost like a public relations hand-out. 
(6) Mrs Thatcher went out of her way to meet Japanese motor company executives 
at receptions m Tokyo Her political philosophy, if not nemsar1ly her personality, 
gave a sense of reas回目nceto Japanese mdustnalists who had previously been 
scathing in their comments on the alleged “British disease”The fear was that it 
might be cont•g1ous 
(7) Sir Geoffrey Howe 'EC lessons for Japan, US', The Japan Times, 22 June 1991. 
(8) ibid 
(9) See 'Stalling Japan’s car makers' The Econom•st, 3 August 1991, 'EC car plants 
face threat on two fronts' The Times, 5 August 1991, and 'Japan-EC Trade 
Accord Fraught With Uncertainties’The New York Times reprinted in The 
Asahi Evening News, 19 August 1991. 
自由 •bid 
00 France and Italy presently mtrict Japanese imports at ve庁 lowlevels but these 
figures are expected to gradually rise by the turn of the century 
Q~ See footnote Q申opcit 
仰 Statementby Kume Yutaka, president of Nissan Motor Co. quoted m New York 
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Times report op cit 
0-0 The Econom"t 3 August 1991 
0~ Washington Post despatch reprinted in The International Herald Tribu即， 17
June 1991, the story was headed 'In a Fearful Europe, Japan’s New Clout 
Prompts a Backlash'. 
自由 See footnote (2) op cit 
白骨 See table on Japanese direct investment m Europe 1989-1990 in appendix. 
。申 TheBritish based International Institute for Strategic Studies, for example, noted 
in its annual report for 1990 that Japan is not yet ready to take a leadership role 
m world affairs. See The Japan Times, I June I991. The institute saw the Gulf 
crisis as confirmahon of the ever cautmus Japanese lme m respondmg to events 
overseas 
自由 Latest statistics in the autumn of I991 showed a large mcrease in Japan's trade 
surplus with the EC Japanese exports to the EC rose 71% in July I991 over the 
f>gures for the same month in I 9日0,while imports from Europe of luxury items 
were greatly reduced in value. ThlS trend wil persist. See Asahi Evening N叫叫
31 August 1991 
側’Howthe West was won', The Times Saturday Revi阻んIJune 1991. The piece 
was by the paper’s former Tokyo correspondent Joe Joseph He voiced some 
concern that Japanese fundmg of Bnt1Sh academw posts might result m what 
one Japanologist warned could be 'self censorship’and a lack of real independ-
ence m d1Scussmg thmgs Japanese 
ω耐 d
仰 See,for example，’.. but the sh叩pmgspree goes on’， The Sunday Times, 18 
August I991 for survey of Japanese purchases in property and prestige shopping 
business目。 ManyRegent Street stores are now closely linked to Japanese 
companies and the scale of Japanese property amb1hons can hardly be matched 
by British institutions. The same pattern was seen earlier in the acquisition of 
landmark buildings in parts of central New York. 
仰 Commentsby Edwina Currie, MP in The Times Saturday Re吋ewop cit. 
Toyota’s green Site car plant IS bemg constructed m her Derbyshire const1tu-
ency 
仰 Seee田町sin Kazuo Sh1bagaki et al (eds) Ja何回seand European Management 
Their International AdaPtab1lity (Tokyo, I989) 
l2l) The EC Commission in Brussels is also likely to be more strict in its monitoring 
。fsuch investment packages. 
側 Theevidence for what Britain wishes to gam from encouraging Japan’s return to 
the arena of "high politics”is necessanly vague Cooperation on arms control, 
such as reg1Sters for overseeing mternational arms sales, mfluence on Japan’s 
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environment and Third World goals, common aims over persuading the People’s 
Republic of China to be responsible m its future actmns with regard to Hong 
Kong and an attempt to reduce American influence on Japan may be on the 
British agenda. 
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過去は水に流し前進せよ
-1990年代の日英関係ー
〈要約〉
ロジャー・ノミックレー
本稿は，この数年聞に生じた日英関係の急激な変容を考察するものであ
る。
過去に対する偏見ならびに無知と， 1990年代への楽観および熱狂との聞
には，非常に大きな隔たりが存在する。昭和天皇の死は，疑いもなく，ロ
ンドy 東京関係の転換期となった。多くの英国民は，日本の軍国主義，
帝国主義に対する昭和天皇の責任を問うていたが，その怒りがおさまると
多くのことが可能となってきた。
現在の日英両国間の良好な感情は，第一に，サッチャ一政権が英国に対
する日本からの投資を誘引するように努力したこと，第二に，自動車産業
を中心とする日本企業が，景気後退期にもかかわらず，新しく英国に大規
模な製造工場を建設することに意欲的であったことに起因している。
現在では，日英両国が経済ならびに金融面で利益を共有する，という新
しい日英同盟が形造られている。少なくとも，両国の数十年の歴史の中
で，初めてそのような関係を論ずることができるようになった。
このように国家関係が，急激に，期待されていなかったような変容を遂
げることは，国際政治の歴史の中でもめずらしいことである。この論文
は，このような国家間関係の変容に関する研究の端緒にすぎず，さらに詳
細な分析，ならびに論評が待たれるところである。
